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FAA accepts full responsibility for fatal mid-air collision

February 3, 2026

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Federal Aviation Administration sign on lawn.

The Federal Aviation Administration’s acceptance of responsibility for a preventable mid-air collision that killed 67 people reveals a catastrophic breakdown in how America’s busiest airspace manages the coexistence of commercial planes and military helicopters.

At a glance

On January 29, 2025, PSA Airlines Flight 5342 and a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter collided over the Potomac River near Reagan National Airport, killing all 67 people on board in the deadliest U.S. air disaster since 2009.
The NTSB determined that the collision was entirely preventable, citing the FAA’s placement of helicopter routes dangerously close to runway approach paths and systemic overreliance on visual separation in nighttime conditions.
The FAA had ignored previous risk mitigation recommendations and failed to regularly review helicopter routes despite known collision risks in the National Capital Region’s congested airspace.
Immediate and permanent restrictions on helicopter operations near DCA have come into effect, with the FAA implementing nationwide reviews of similar high-risk airspace hotspots using AI analysis.

A system designed to fail

Reagan National Airport sits at the intersection of competing priorities: post-9/11 security restrictions that funnel commercial traffic into a narrow corridor, military training requirements and law enforcement helicopter operations. The FAA managed this complexity by relying on “see and avoid” protocols, essentially asking pilots to visually spot and dodge. On a clear day and with good visibility, it works. On a dark night with pilots wearing night vision goggles, it becomes Russian roulette.

The helicopter’s route which led to the collision was positioned dangerously close to the approach path of Runway 33. This was not an accident or an oversight discovered after the fact. The FAA was aware of the risk of collisions in this airspace. Previous recommendations for route changes existed. Nothing happened.

At night everything went wrong

On January 29, 2025, at 8:43 p.m., PSA Airlines Flight 5342, a regional jet carrying 64 passengers and crew, contacted DCA Tower on its final approach from Wichita, Kansas. Simultaneously, a U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter was conducting night vision goggle training from Davison Army Airfield. The helicopter crew reported visual contact with the aircraft on two occasions and initiated self-separation. What happened next remains partially unclear: a possible radio transmission problem prevented full communication with the tower. At 8:47:59 p.m., at approximately 300 feet altitude and less than half a mile from the runway threshold, the aircraft collided. The jet was traveling at 128 mph; the helicopter’s radio altitude indicated 278 feet. Both planes were destroyed. All 67 people on board died.

Witnesses on the ground reported seeing the plane “split in two.” The helicopter was found upside down. Another pilot in the area saw flares. Within hours, the grim confirmation arrived: no survivors. The deadliest American air disaster since the 2009 Colgan Air crash had just occurred in one of the most controlled airspaces in the United States, overseen by the nation’s top air safety regulator.

Systemic negligence, not human error

When the NTSB issued its probable cause determination on January 27, 2026, it did not place primary blame on the helicopter pilots or crew. Instead, he criticized the FAA for systemic failures spanning years. The agency had placed a helicopter training route in close proximity to active runway approach paths. The company overrelied on visual separation, a technique that fails in darkness, bad weather and high-workload situations. DCA air traffic controllers were overwhelmed, manning helicopter checkpoints and local checkpoints simultaneously, losing situational awareness at the critical moment.

The NTSB called it “100% preventable.” The FAA, to its credit, has accepted its responsibility rather than shying away from it. Within 24 hours of the collision, restrictions on helicopter operations near DCA were implemented. On January 22, 2026, Secretary of Transportation Sean P. Duffy formalized a permanent ban on non-essential helicopter flights in the region. The FAA has initiated mandatory Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) requirements and initiated nationwide reviews of similar collision hotspots using AI analysis to identify risk patterns.

A judgment that should have come sooner

The frustration inherent in the NTSB’s findings is not subtle. The FAA had data. The FAA had already made recommendations. The FAA knew of the “see and avoid” limitations in night operations. Yet the agency prioritized operational efficiency and access to military training over route redesigns that created inherent collision risks. It wasn’t ignorance; it was institutional inertia.

What makes this tragedy particularly difficult for aviation professionals and the families of the 67 victims is that it is preventable. Every element that led to the collision – the route layout, the visual separation protocol, the controller’s workload, the nighttime conditions – was known and treatable. The system did not fail due to technological limitations or unpredictable human error. It failed because an agency responsible for security made choices that prioritized other considerations.

What comes next

The actions taken by the FAA after the accident were significant. The AI-based analysis identified similar collision hotspots across the country, including Van Nuys and Hollywood Burbank airports, where helicopter models were adjusted to reduce Traffic Collision Evidence System (TCAS) alerts. The shift away from visual separation to procedural separation and increased reliance on radar/ADS-B represents a fundamental shift in how the agency manages high-risk airspace. An inspector general audit in August 2025, praised by the FAA, signals continued scrutiny. FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said clearly: “There must never be another tragedy. »

The success of these reforms depends on lasting commitment. Aviation history shows that improvements made after an accident often fade as the emergency dissipates and competing interests resurface. The families of these 67 people – passengers, crew members and military personnel – deserve more than temporary measures. They deserve an aviation system where “see and avoid” in the dark is never again considered acceptable safety protocol, where helicopter routes are never again randomly placed near runway approaches, and where an agency’s data and recommendations actually guide decision-making before tragedy strikes.